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Abstract
The concept of complexity (as a quantity) has been plagued by nu-
merous contradictory and confusing definitions. By explicitly recognising
a role for the observer of a system, an observer that attaches meaning
to data about the system, these contradictions can be resolved, and the
numerous complexity measures that have been proposed can be seen as
cases where different observers are relevant, and/or being proxy measures
that loosely scale with complexity, but are easy to compute from the avail-
able data. Much of the epistemic confusion in the subject can be squarely
placed at science’s tradition of removing the observer from the description
in order to guarantee objectivity.
Explicitly acknowledging the role of the observer helps untangle other
confused subject areas. Emergence is a topic about which much ink has
been spilt, but it can be understand easily as an irreducibility between
description space and meaning space. Quantum Mechanics can also be
understood as a theory of observation. The success in explaining quantum
mechanics, leads one to conjecture that all of physics may be reducible to
properties of the observer.
And indeed, what are the necessary (as opposed to contingent) prop-
erties of an observer? This requires a full theory of consciousness, from
which we are a long way from obtaining. However where progress does ap-
pear to have been made, e.g. Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained,
a recurring theme of self-observation is a crucial ingredient.
1 Introduction
I have set myself the “humble” task of understanding how evolution leads to
continuous generation of complexity and novelty. To circumscribe certain un-
productive lines of argument, I take as given that biological evolution proceeds
through a perfectly mechanistic process, that there is no supernatural interven-
tion. What remains is the task of reverse engineering the evolutionary process.
Since the 1970s, various evolutionary algorithms[7] have been proposed and
implemented on computers. None of these algorithms have clearly demonstrated
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open-ended creativity, or growth of complexity[2]. In fact, the very notion of
complexity is muddy[6], which is caused by the traditional scientific notion of
objectivity as removing the observer from the description[14].
Complexity turns out to be intrinsically observer dependent. This is not
the disaster many scientists might fear, however, as in all applicable cases there
will be a natural choice of observer. Including the observer into the picture
actually simplifies and unifies the disparate notions of complexity that have
been proposed.
Complex systems theory is not the only area where including the observer
makes theories comprehensible. There are three independent derivations of the
fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics, based on assumed properties
of the observer. Each of these has a slightly different starting point: Bruno
Marchal assumes that an observer is equivalent to some unspecified computer
program[10], Roy Frieden starts from Fisher information theory[8], a branch of
statistics that predicts the observational error for an ideal observer, and my
own derivation starts from an all universes ensemble with zero information, a
psychological phenomenon of time (implicitly assumed in both Marchal and
Frieden’s approaches) and projection as a model of measurement (observed out-
comes are selected from the set of possible observation according to a probability
distribution)[15].
2 Complexity as a quantity
We have an intuitive notion of complexity as a quantity; we often speak of
something being more or less complex than something else. However, capturing
what we mean by complexity in a formal way has proved far more difficult, than
other more familiar quantities we use, such as length, area and mass.
In these more conventional cases, the quantities in question prove to be
decomposable in a linear way, ie a 5cm length can be broken into 5 equal parts
1 cm long; and they can also be directly compared — a mass can be compared
with a standard mass by comparing the weights of the two objects on a balance.
However, complexity is not like that. Cutting an object in half does not
leave you with two objects having half the complexity overall. Nor can you
easily compare the complexity of two objects, say an apple and an orange, in
the same way you can compare their masses. However, the earliest attempts at
deriving a measure took this approach.
The simplest such measure is the number of parts definition. A car is more
complex than a bicycle, because it contains more parts. However, a pile of sand
contains an enormous number of parts (each grain of sand), yet it is not so
complex since each grain of sand is conceptually the same, and the order of the
grains in the pile is not important. Another definition used is the number of
distinct parts, which partially circumvents this problem. The problem with this
idea is that a shopping list and a Shakespearian play will end up having the
same complexity, since it is constructed from the same set of parts (the 26 letters
of the alphabet — assuming the shopping list includes items like zucchini, wax
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and quince, of course). An even bigger problem is to define precisely what one
means by “part”. This is an example of the context dependence of complexity,
which we’ll explore further later.
Bonner[3] and McShea[11] have used these (organism size, number of cell
types) and other proxy complexity measures to analyse complexity trends in
evolution. They argue that all these measures trend in the same way when
figures are available for the same organism, hence are indicative of an underlying
organism complexity value. This approach is of most value when analysing
trends within a single phylogenetic line, such as the diversification of trilobytes.
2.1 Information as Complexity
The single simplest unifying concept that covers all of the preceding consider-
ations is information. The more information required to specify a system, the
more complex it is. A sandpile is simple, because the only information required
is that it is made of sand grains (each considered to be identical, even if they
aren’t in reality), and the total number of grains in the pile. However, a typical
motorcar requires a whole book of blueprints in its specification.
Information theory began in the work of Shannon in the 1940s, who was con-
cerned with the practical problem of ensuring reliable transmission of messages.
Every possible message has a certain probability of occurring. The less likely
a message is, the more information it imparts to the listener of that message.
The precise relationship is given by a logarithm:
I = − log2 p (1)
where p is the probability of the message, and I is the information it contains
for the listener. The base of the logarithm determines what units information is
measured in — base 2 means the information is expressed in bits. Base 256 could
be used to express the result in bytes, and is of course equivalent to dividing
equation (1) by 8.
Writing the probability of a symbol x drawn from an alphabet A appears in
message s as p(x), equation (1) can be approximated:
I(s) ≈
n∑
i=1
∑
xi∈A
p(xi) log2 p(xi). (2)
Shannon, of course, was not so interested in the semantic content of the message
(ie its meaning), rather in the task of information transmission so the probability
distributions p(x) were simply those of the symbols for the language in question,
eg English, for which the letter ‘e’ is considerably more likely than the letter
‘q’. This equation can be refined by considering possible pairs of letters, then
possible triplets, in the limit converging on the minimum amount of information
required to be transmitted in order for the message to be reconstructed in its
original form. That this value may be considerably less that just sending the
original message in its entirety is the basis of compression algorithms, such as
those employed by the well-known gzip or PKzip (aka WinZip) programs.
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L1 Syntactic layer
L2 Semantic layer
B is more complex (or has greater in-
formation) than A, because the set B
is smaller than A
Figure 1: Diagram showing the syntactic and semantic spaces. Two different
messages, having meanings A and B, can each be coded in many equivalent
ways in syntactic space, represented by the sets A and B. The information or
complexity of the messages is related to the size it occupies in syntactic space
by formula (1)
The issue of semantic content discouraged a lot of people of applying this
formalism to complexity measures. The problem is that a message written in
English will mean something to a native English speaker, but be total gibberish
to someone brought up in the Amazon jungle with no contact with the English
speaking world. The information content of the message depends on exactly
who the listener is! Whilst this context dependence appears to make the whole
enterprise hopeless, it is in fact a feature of all of the measures discussed so far.
When counting the number of parts in a system, one must make a decision as to
what exactly constitutes a part, which is invariably somewhat subjective, and
needs to be decided by consensus or convention by the parties involved in the
discussion. Think of the problems in trying decide whether a group of animals
is one species of two, or which genus they belong to. The same issue arises
with the characterisation of the system by a network. When is a relationship
considered a graph edge, when often every component is connected to every
other part in varying degrees.
However, in many situations, there appears to be an obvious way of parti-
tioning the system, or categorising it. In such a case, where two observers agree
on the same way of interpreting a system, then they can agree on the complexity
that system has. If there is no agreement on how to perform this categorisation,
then complexity is meaningless
To formalise complexity then, assume as given a classifier system that can
categorise descriptions into equivalence classes. Clearly, humans are very good
at this — they’re able to recognise patterns even in almost completely random
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data. Rorschach plots are random ink plots that are interpreted by viewers as a
variety of meaningful images. However, a human classifier system is not the only
possibility. Another is the classification of programs executed by a computer by
what output they produce. Technically, in these discussions, researchers use a
Universal Turing Machine (UTM), an abstract model of a computer.
Consider then the set of possible binary strings, which can fed into a UTM
U as a program. Some of these programs cause U to produce some output
then halt. Others will continue executing forever. In principle, it is impossible
to determine generally if a program will halt or continue on indefinitely. This
is the so called halting problem. Now consider a program p that causes the
UTM to output a specific string s and then halt. Since the UTM halts after
a certain number of instructions executed (denoted ℓ(p)) the same result is
produced by feeding in any string starting with the same ℓ(p) bits. If the strings
have equal chance of being chosen (uniform measure), then the proportion of
strings starting with the same initial ℓ(p) bits is 2−ℓ(p). This leads to the
universal prior distribution over descriptions s, also known as the Solomonoff-
Levin distribution:
P (s) =
∫
U(p)=s
2−ℓ(p)dp (3)
The complexity (or information content) of the description is given by equa-
tion (1), or simply the logarithm of (3). In the case of an arbitrary classifier
system, the complexity is given by the negative logarithm of the equivalence
class size
C(x) = lim
s→∞
s log2N − log2 ω(s, x) (4)
where N is the size of the alphabet used to encode the description and ω(s, x)
is the number of equivalent descriptions to x of size s or less.
It turns out that the probability P (s) in equation (3) is dominated by the
shortest program, namely
K(s) ≤ log2 P (s) ≤ K(s) + C
where C is a constant independent of the description s. K(s) is the length of
the shortest program p that causes U to output s and halt, and is called the
Kolmogorov Complexity or Algorithmic Complexity.
An interesting difference between Kolmogorov Complexity, and the general
complexity based on human observers can be seen by considering the case of
random strings. Random, as used in algorithmic information theory, means that
no shorter algorithm can be found to produce a string than simply saying “print
. . . ”, where the . . . is a literal representation of the string. The Kolmogorov
complexity of a random string is high, at least as high as the length of the string
itself. However, a human observer simply sees a random string as a jumble of
letters, much the same as any other random string. In this latter case, the
equivalence class of random strings is very large, close to probability one, so the
perceived complexity is small. Thus the human classifier defines an example
of what Gell-Mann calls effective complexity[9], which measures the length of a
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concise description of the regular parts of the description, ignoring the random
components.
3 Complexity as a quality — Emergence
It is often thought that complex systems are a separate category of systems to
simple systems. So what is it that distinguishes a complex system, such as a
living organism, or an economy, from a simple system, such as a pair of pliers?
This question is related to the notorious question of What is Life?, however
may have a simpler answer, since not all complex systems are living, or even
associated with living systems.
Consider the concept of emergence. We intuitively recognise emergence as
patterns arising out of the interactions of the components in a system, but
not implicit in the components themselves. Examples include the formation of
hurricanes from pressure gradients in the atmosphere, crashes in stock markets,
flocking behaviour of many types of animals and of course, life itself.
Let us consider a couple of simple illustrative examples, that are well known
and understood. The first is the ideal gas, a model gas made up of large num-
bers of non-interacting point particles obeying Newton’s laws of motion. A
thermodynamic description of the gas is obtained by averaging:
temperature (T ) is the average kinetic energy of the particles;
pressure (P ) is the average force applied to a unit area of the boundary by
the particles colliding with it;
density (ρ) is the average mass of particles in a unit volume;
The ideal gas law is simply a reflection of the underlying laws of motion, averaged
over all the particles:
Pρ ∝ T
The thermodynamic state is characterised by the two parameters T and ρ. The
so-called first law of thermodynamics is simply a statement of conservation of
energy and matter, in average form.
An entirely different quantity enters the picture in the form of entropy. Con-
sider discretising the underlying phase-space into cubes of size hN , (N being the
number of particles) and then counting the number of such cubes having tem-
perature T and density ρ, ω(T, ρ,N). The entropy of the system is given by
S(T, ρ,N) = kB lnω(T, ρ,N) (5)
where kB is a conversion constant that expresses entropy in units of Joules per
Kelvin. One can immediately see the connection between complexity (eq. 4) and
entropy. Readers familiar with quantum mechanics will recognise h as being an
analogue of Planck’s constant. However, the ideal gas is not a quantum system,
and as h → 0, entropy diverges! It turns out that in the thermodynamic limit
(N →∞), the per-particle entropy S/N is independent of the size of h.
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The second law of thermodynamics is a recognition of the fact that the system
is more likely to move to a state occupying a larger region of phase space, than
a smaller region of phase space, namely that ω(T, ρ,N) must increase in time.
Correspondingly entropy must also increase (or remain constant) over time.
This is a probabilistic statement that only becomes exact in the thermodynamic
limit. At the syntactic, or specification level of description (ie Newton’s laws of
motion), the system is perfectly reversible (we can recover the system’s initial
state by merely reversing the velocities of all the particles), yet at the semantic
(thermodynamic) level, the system is irreversible (entropy can only increase,
never decrease).
The property of irreversibility is an emergent property of the ideal gas, as
it is not entailed by the underlying specification. It comes about because of
the additional identification of the thermodynamic state, namely the set of all
micro-states possessing the same temperature and density. This is additional
information to what is contained in the microscopic description, and that entails
the second law.
The second example I’d like to raise (but not analyse in such great depth) is
the well known Game of Life[4], introduced by John Conway, and popularised
in Martin Gardiner’s Mathematical Recreations column in 1970. This is a 2
dimensional cellular automaton (2D grid of cells), where each cell can be one
of two states. Dynamics on the system is imposed by the rule that the state of
a cell depends on the values of its immediate neighbours at the previous time
step.
Upon running the Game of Life, one immediately recognises a huge menagery
of emergent objects, such as blocks, blinkers and gliders. Take gliders for ex-
ample. This is a pattern that moves diagonally through the grid. The human
observer recognises this pattern, and can use it to predict the behaviour of the
system with less effort than simulating the full cellular automaton. It is a model
of the system. However, the concept of a glider is not entailed by the CA specifi-
cation, which contains only states and transition rules. It requires the additional
identification of a pattern by the observer.
This leads to a general formulation of emergence. Consider a system specified
in a language L1, which can be called the specification, or syntactic layer (see
figure 1). If one accepts the principle of reduction, all systems can ultimately be
specified the common language of the theoretical physics of elementary parti-
cles. However, an often believed corollary of reduction is that this specification
encodes all there is to know about the system. The above two examples shows
this corollary to be manifestly false. Many systems exhibit one or more good
models, in another language L2, which can be called the semantic layer. The
system’s specification does not entail completely the behaviour of the semantic
model, since the latter also depends on specific identifications made by the ob-
server. In such a case, we say that properties of the semantic model is emergent
with respect to the syntactic specification.
The concept of “good” model deserves further discussion. In our previous
two examples, neither the thermodynamic model, nor the glider model can be
said to perfectly capture the behaviour of the system. For example, the second
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law of thermodynamics only holds in the thermodynamic limit — entropy may
occasionally decrease in finite sized systems. A model based on gliders cannot
predict what happens when two gliders collide. However, in both of these cases,
the semantic model is cheap to evaluate, relative to simulating the full system
specification. This makes the model “good” or “useful” to the observer. We
don’t prescribe here exactly how to generate good models here, but simply
note that in all cases of recognised emergence, the observer has defined a least
one semantic and a syntactic model of the system, and that these models are
fundamentally incommensurate. Systems exhibiting emergence in this precise
sense can be called complex.
4 An Ontology of Bitstrings
Consider a program of explaining the world of appearances, of explaining Kan-
tian phenomena. Kant distinguishes two categories of being — the phenomenon,
or thing as it appears, and the noumenon, or thing as it is. If phenomena can
be explained in a closed manner, ie without appeal to an underlying noumenon,
then perhaps the noumenon can be dispatched in the manner of Laplace’s reply
to Napoleon Bonaparte: Je n’ai besoin de cet hypothe`se.
Phenomena (appearance) arises through the registering of data by the con-
scious observer, through the attachment of meaning to raw data. This is the
situation captured in Fig. 1. Suppose, therefore that all possible bitstrings exist,
in uniform measure. By virtue of equation (4), the information content of this
complete set is precisely zero, independent of the observer. Such an assumption
is a minimal ontology, on a par with assuming that nothing exists. One could
also paraphrase it as saying no constraints exist. In deference to the influence of
Plato, such an all encompassing object is often termed a Plenitude or sometimes
Platonia. I use the indefinite article here, as alternatives do exist: eg all logically
consistent systems, all mathematical systems[16], all possible computations[13].
Equation (1) implies that the phenomena observed should be more likely
to be simple than complex, leading to an explanation of the value of Occam’s
Razor: that things should not be multiplied unnecessarily[15].
Furthermore, by supposing that the observer is parameterised by an ordered
set (called (psychological) time) such that only a finite number (but increasing
as a function of time) of bits of the bitstring are meaningful, and also that
observers’ interpretations are robust in the presence of noise (evolutionarily
speaking, it is not a good idea to be fooled by lions in camouflage), we get a
solution to the problem of induction. The world will, by and large, continue to
follow the rules it has followed previously[15].
Some further elaboration of this concept of time is needed, as time is often
considered to be an illusion[12]. I find that “illusion” is an overly strong word
here — it implies that we are tricked into observing something that is not, in
fact, there. I would argue that the second law of thermodynamics is also a
similar phenomenon — it comes about from our propensity to classify systems,
for instance, according to thermodynamic variables. Yet there would be howls
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of protest from my physicist colleagues if one were to assert that the second
law of thermodynamics is an illusion. What we have in fact is two equally
valid descriptions of the world — an “external” one, in which time appears as
a coordinate, measured with clocks, and an “internal” one with present, future
and past. Thus we should really speak of psychological time as emergent, just
as real, but irreducible to the objective world of physics.
This is undoubtedly an idealist stance. Idealism contrasts with realism by
giving primacy to the subjective world of appearances. In common with many
idealist philosophies, there is a problem to solve with the appearance of consis-
tency between different observer perceptions of reality. Unlike Bishop Berkeley,
we need not appeal to beneficent deity, nor unlike Kant do we need to appeal
to an unknowable Noumenon in order to explain this consistency. Rather we
appeal to what is known as the Anthropic Principle, which effectively states
that reality’s appearance must be consistent with our presence in that reality as
an observer[1].
The Anthropic Principle is in fact a tautology, if one accepts a concrete
reality (realism in other words). If the appearance of reality were not consistent
with our existence, we would conclude that we have been imprisoned within a
virtual reality of some kind, and that bodies occupy a greater reality than the
one we see. In fact, the Anthropic Principle is not some quaint philosophical
principle, but has real scientifically testable consequences. In all such cases, the
Anthropic Principle has been confirmed, particularly in cosmology[1].
In an idealistic setting, however, the anthropic principle is somewhat of a
mystery. Why shouldn’t we be spending our entire lives dreaming a reality that
has nothing whatsoever to do with us as observers? If it weren’t for the con-
sistency requirement of the anthropic principle, the Occam’s razor result would
imply that we’d experience a universe that is too simple to support life. The
complexity of our observed universe is in fact the minimum possible complexity
that allows conscious life. We can only suppose that the still to be found the-
ory of consciousness will require self-awareness as a necessary requirement for
consciousness. This in turn implies that we, as observers are embedded in the
reality we observe. This fundamental closure of observer and observed, closes
the ontology of bitstrings, and cuts off the prospect of solipsism.
5 Quantum Mechanics
By reasoning about the appearance of reality, and of the nature of observation,
we have lead to a number of properties of consciousness we expect a valid the-
ory of consciousness to have. These include the property of classifying reality
(attaching meaning), psychological time, meaning robustness and the anthropic
principle. Combining classification with time, we have projection, namely the
process of converting possible into actual. Periodically, we observe a few more
bits of our reality bitstring, and our understanding is updated. By introducing
the framework of probability theory, one can mathematically derive a predictive
theory of what is actually observed. That predictive theory is the Hilbert space
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structure of quantum mechanics, vectors in the Hilbert space evolve accord-
ing to Schro¨dingers equation and the probabilities are given by Born’s rule[15].
Quantum Mechanics is simply a theory of observation!
Roy Frieden uses a slightly different formulation of statistical inference[8].
An observer trying to measure some physical quantity, will experience an error
e, which at minimum is bounded by the inverse of something called Fisher
Information I:
e2I ≥ 1 (6)
The ideal observer will of course attempt to observe reality in such a way as
to maximise I — such an extremum principle he calls the Principle of Extreme
Physical Information, and using it, along with assorted symmetry principles, he
is able to derive all sorts of basic physics equations: the Klein-Gordon equation
(which is the relativistic version of Schro¨dinger’s equation), Maxwell’s equations
of electrodynamics and Einstein’s field equations of General Relativity.
As a third possible route to quantum mechanics from observerhood, Bruno
Marchal considers the consequences of computationalism, that we as observers
are equivalent to programs running on a Turing machine (an abstract model
of a computer)[10]. By adopting a theory of knowledge proposed by Plato in
Thaetetus, and translating it into logical terms, he demonstrates that knowledge
about observed reality must obey the axioms of quantum logic, a logic which also
describes the behaviour of subspaces of a Hilbert space. Whilst the conclusions
might be weaker than those derived by myself or Frieden, it has the advantage
of being an independent derivation, and also of making use of fewer assumptions
about the nature of conscious observation that Frieden and I make.
Thus we see a reversal in the usual ontology between the observer (“psychol-
ogy”) and physics. Physics is actually emergent from psychology, and by the
Anthropic Principle, must be emergent from physics.
6 Conclusion
The success in reversing the usual ontology between the observer (“psychology”)
and physics in the case of quantum mechanics leads one to conjecture that the
other pillar of 20th century physics, Einstein’s theory of relativity may also be
related to properties of the observer.
If we take this approach seriously, by showing a possible reduction of physics
to psychology, physics constrains the possible forms a theory of consciousness
might take. We have seen that the Anthropic Principle is pivotal, and this
implies self-awareness as necessary property of consciousness. We have also
seen that psychological time, is also crucial. Even though brains are messy,
asynchronous, parallel processors, somehow a sequential process emerges to give
the appearance of psychological time. Finally, the mind attaches meaning to
data in a robust fashion. This is a selection process, analogous to natural
selection in Darwinian evolution.
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If we take a look at Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained[5] 1, we see all
of these features appearing. Firstly much is made of self-awareness, which Den-
nett calls autostimulation, and is what he calls a good evolutionary trick. Sec-
ondly, he argues that a sequential von Neumannesque architecture must emerge
from an underlying Pandemonium, something he calls the Joycean machine, in
honour of James Joyce’s stream of consciousness. Finally, he argues that in-
stead of a Cartesian theatre in which consciousness reside, a Pandemonium of
independent parallel processes compete in an evolutionary process, that results
in a series of rewritten “drafts” of understanding.
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